We analyse the effects on industry structure of non strategic learning by doing with spillovers in a differentiated oligopolyà la Bertrand. The dynamics is driven by a non linear learning curve. Conditions for shakeouts are analysed, focusing on the key factors affecting them. Policy interventions to limit shakeouts are suggested.
Introduction
The economic literature provides empirical evidence of how learning by doing and spillovers shape the industrial structure (Zimmerman (1982) , Lieberman (1989) , Foster and Rosenzweig (1995) ). Consequently, the analysis of the effects of learning by doing and spillovers has emerged as an important research topic for consideration of industrial policies. In this paper, following Jin, Perota-Pena and Troege (2004), we present and characterize the dynamic behaviour of a simple model representing a differentiated oligopolỳ a la Bertrand whose dynamics is driven by non strategic learning by doing and spillovers. The model of Jin et al. has the merit of specifying with surprisingly simple equations the dynamic evolution of this industry. However, the learning process is very stylised. They assume a linear learning curve with spillovers. This assumption does not allow to consider the diminishing returns to scale which typically characterise the learning process and moreover does not identify the crucial role of the asymptotic value of the cost function in the dynamic outcome of the system. We depart from the paper by Jin, Perota-Pena and Troege (2004) in two ways. First, we propose a nonlinear dynamic cost function that enable us to find rigorously a positive stationary point as the asymptotic outcome of the market evolution. Second, the dynamic cost function has a richer structure in the sense that considers the rate of cost decreasing, the asymptotic value of marginal cost function and the initial cost value. This richer specification of the learning curve allows us to determine rigorously all the key factors affecting the industry evolution. Particularly, we find a short cut condition for the occurrence of shakeouts.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we recall the Jin, Perota-Pena and Troege model. In section 3, we analyse the dynamic outcome of the system assuming a non linear learning curve with spillovers.
The Jin, Perota-Pena and Troege Model
For the convenience of the reader, we recall the demand function by Jin, Perota-Pena and Troege model (2004) . The setting is characterised by n firms competingà la Bertrand in a differentiated market with n products (x 1 , ..., x n ) and a numeraire good (x 0 ). As usual, the price of the numeraire good is normalised to 1. Firm i demand function in each period t is obtained solving the following consumer maximisation problem:
where A, δ > 0, x it , p it denote respectively firm i's output and price in period t, y the representative consumer income, 0 < r < 1 the degree of substitutability between goods. The extreme cases of perfect substitutability between goods (r = 1) and complete independence (r = 0) are excluded. Each firm thus in each period is facing the demand function:
Each oligopolist is playing a Bertrand game in each period, choosing p it in order to maximise the current profit:
Solving the oligopolist first order conditions, the equilibrium price is obtained:
Substituting this equilibrium value in the demand function, the equilibrium output in each period is given by:
Non Linear Learning Curve With Spillovers
In (1), firm's current output is linked to the level of current costs. To describe the dynamic evolution of the system, another equation linking the level of current costs to the previous output is required. The learning curve provides this additional equation. In contrast with Jin et al., we are not assuming a linear relation between current cost and own or total industry output in the previous period, but a more complex cost dynamic behaviour.
The learning curve that we are using in this work is given by:
where D i is the rate of cost decreasing, c min i is the asymptotic value of the marginal cost function, c io is the initial marginal cost value, a i and b i denote respectively the intensity of the learning by doing and of the spillover effect. We propose this functional dependence since it is able to describe the most general non linear behaviour, allowing for diminishing returns and asymptotic value of the cost function.
Industry dynamics is given by equations (2) and (1). Plugging (2) in (1), we get the following system of n difference equations:
where In the following figures (1-3) , we present simulations of the system dynamics in the duopoly case, assuming different asymptotic values of firm marginal cost (firm 2 is always the advantaged firm). We set the demand parameters as A = 10, λ = 0.5 and φ = 0.3. Changes in the values of these demand parameters do not affect qualitatively the results. = 0.5 for the other firm. An increase in D i lowers the cost stationary value for both firms, even if the level of the cost asymptotic value is never reached. Whichever is the value of D i , the cost level of the stationary state is bigger than its asymptotic value.
Figures 2 and 3 represent respectively the effect of different learning by doing and spillover parameters on the dynamic behaviour of the system. Increasing levels of both parameters lower the cost in each period. In our model, thus, spillovers are definitely beneficial to the system. Even with a more complex learning curve, we confirm the results of beneficial spillover effects obtained with non strategic learning and linear learning curves (see Jin et al. (2004) ). Since also in our model learning is passive (it is driven by quantity decision of the previous period), the usual trade-off between incentives and cost reduction of strategic learning models does not occur (see, for example, Fudenberg and Tirole (1983) or Ghemawat and Spence (1985) ). In order to improve welfare, government should encourage information exchange between firms. Specifically, it should promote the formation of technological consortia. A technological sharing agreement will improve the efficiency of the production process of both firms and will reduce costs. Also the learning parameter a i has a straightforward effect on dynamics behaviour. Costs decrease as a i increases. In contrast with the result of the linear cost case, the effect of the learning-by-doing parameter does not seem to have difficult interpretation in our case. Whichever is the entity of the spillover effect, the learning-by-doing coefficient will ever improve firm performance.
Finally, we analyse the effect of learning by doing and spillover effects on industry shakeouts. The index c = P n j c * j /n measures the average stationary cost level of the industry. It synthesises the level of efficiency of the system. Let us define µ = Proof. Firm i's market share (s i ) is given by: 
Two factors influence the occurrence of shakeouts in the system: market size and the general level of efficiency of the system. Higher the size of the market (higher value of A), lower the probability that the firm exits the market. Indeed, learning-by-doing activities and spillover transmissions are magnified and amplified with large markets. As far as the system efficiency is concerned, lower levels of c increase the probability of shakeouts. More efficient the system, lower the probability for the less advantaged firm to survive in the competition process. Information transmission should be encouraged by government intervention. Increasing values of the learning-by-doing and the spillover effect increase the efficiency of the single firm relatively to the others, reducing the possibility of concentration in the system. figure 4 , we show how the firm cost comparative condition affects the industry evolution of a duopoly in which the source of asymmetry is only due to the difference in the asymptotic cost value. We observe that if one firm is in a quite favorable cost condition with respect to the other (cost gap is sufficiently great) only the most efficient firm survives (firm 2). If, instead, this gap is relatively small, shakeout does not occur. In the case that the asymptotic cost conditions are equal, all firms survive in the market with equal shares. This result holds whichever is the magnitude of the spillover effect, the learning-by-doing parameters, the market size. Qualitatively, the same market evolution occurs when the entity of the cost gap is due to asymmetries in other parameters affecting the efficiency of firms.
